Referring to Erdmann, Twardowski admits, that he has discovered the way the logical correlations can correspond not only to judgements, but also, for example, to desires [8]. He justly remarks, that not only real but also imagined judgements are rendered by means of the sentences. Indeed, if I am an artist, for example, then the grass I am painting must not obligatory be green. Equally, it can be violet if an artist sees it in such a way.

Twardowski stresses, that content of the imagination and the object of the imagination are not in one and the same sense “something imagined”, offering to state further, what the expression “imagined” means (if it is made on the object of imagination) and its sense in correlation to the content of the imagination.

Analyzing the meaning of the expression “imagined” if it is spoken about the object of the imagined, K. Twardowski gives an interesting example. We say “a painter is painting a picture” and say “a painter is painting a landscape”. One and the same painter’s activity is directed to two objects, and the result of this activity is one. The painter after finishing his work has a finished picture and a painted landscape in front of him. Twardowski stresses the double role of the word “painted”. If the word is used concerning the picture, then it determines the property of the picture to be painted and nothing else. If they say the landscape is painted, then the latter is a modifying definition: the painted landscape is not really a landscape, but canvas worked out according to the colouristics rules. And the painted landscape is not a landscape, but a picture. Double object corresponds to the verb “vorstellen“, as well as to the verb “to paint”: the object which is imagined, and the content which is also imagined. The content is a picture, the object is a landscape [9].

The imagined object in the sense, in which the painted landscape is a picture, is a content of the imagination, and the imagined in the imagination content actually is the content. The content of the object and the imagined object are the same, the expression “vorstellt”, as the definition of the object is a variation, since the imagined object is not an object any more, but only the content of the imagination. The painted landscape is not a landscape any longer, but a picture. Twardowski notices, that the painted landscape, picture represents (darstelle) something, which just in this sense is not something painted. Similarly, the content of the imagined refers to something, which is not the content of the imagination, but an object analogous image of this imagination, in which the landscape is a “Sujet” of the picture depicting it [10]. The landscape in such a way turned to be represented in the picture, depicted.

01 Мар 2016 в 09:05. В рубриках: Арт-заметки. Автор: admin_lgaki

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