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According to Bolzano, it is necessary to strictly differentiate between the imagination in itself and the object of imagination. He understands the object of the imagination as the thing (existable or non-existable something), they usually talk of, as imaginable or that is the imagination of it. It is easier to understand, what must be the thing belonging to the imagination, if it is the object existing in reality. But Bolzano draws our attention to the fact  that there are imaginations, which do not have any object at all, such as nothing, square root of minus one and so on [14].

Bolzano writes that some ambiguity of the expression “Vorstellung von einem Gegenstande” arises due to correspondence that should take place between imagination and its object, is thought as a kind of semblance of the compositions of both. And consequently, they consider that parts the composition consists of must be only imaginations of the parts, its object consists of. And the author emphasizes that such understanding seems incorrect. Firstly, because there are imaginations having no any object, for example, the imagination “nothing”, “a round square” and  others. Or for example, the imagination, rendered by the expression “a country without mountains”, where the parts of the mountains are pointed out, which are not really included in the object composition.

Some researchers believe that if every object is nothing but totality of all the properties, then the imagination corresponding to it must be nothing but totality of all the imaginations about these properties. Still every object has such properties, which though necessarily attributive to it, are not at all thought as the constituent parts of the imagination about this object.

K.Twardowski says, that “we judge on an object, but when we admit it, it turns out that together with this we admit its existence. …If somebody thinks in case of admitting or rejection of the object, the connection between an attribute “existence” and an object is admitted or rejected, then he does not see, that in admitting this connection, admitting of the connected parts are implicitly contained, and denial of some connection of its part is not denied” [15].

01 Мар 2016 в 09:05. В рубриках: Арт-заметки. Автор: admin_lgaki

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