Просмотров 93

K. Twardowski comes to the conclusion, that when speaking about “imagined objects”, they mean two things: the object is “imagined” – can mean, that the object together with many other relations, it enters with other objects, is also located as one of two members in a definite reference to some cognitive living being. In this sense the imagined object is the same thing as extended and But in the other sense the imagined object will mean something opposite to a real object. In this case the imagined object is not any longer an object, the content of the imagination. It is something quite different from a real object.

For an artist a picture is a means to imagine (darzustellen) a landscape, he wants to depict a landscape, real or imagined, he depicts it when he paints his picture. Making, painting a picture, he paints a landscape. The landscape will be the primary object of the artist’s activity, and the picture will be a secondary one. When an imaginer imagines an object, he simultaneously imagines the content related to it [11].

But any picture has a title, which will be expressed by judgement, with a subject and the corresponding predicative characteristics. The titles can vary from “Composition X”, “Without a Title”, “The Blue Sky” by W. Kandinsky, “The Square of Concord”, “Composition with Red, Yellow, Blue and Black” by P. Mondrian up to “A Basket with Bread”, “The Way of Riddle”, “Hitler’s Riddle” by S. Dalí. And if the work by W. Kandinsky is called “The Blue Sky”, it does not at all mean that we’ll see the blue sky in a usual understanding of this word-combination.

Analyzing the imagination and the object of the imagination (Vorstellen), Twardowski asserts, that all the previous conclusions were silently based on the supposition that some object corresponds to every imagination without exceptions. However there is a group of such imaginations, which have no correspondences to any objects, he calls them “gegenstandslose”, referring to the Bolzano’s claim, that there exist objectless imaginations, i. e. imaginations without objects [12].

Bolzano wrote several pages on the problem of objectless in “Wissenschaftslehre”, and in “Paradoxes of the Infinite”. Bolzano writes that the possibility to think a thing does not make in any way a basis for possibility of its existence. It is quite the opposite; the possibility of thing existence makes a basis for a clever living being if it is not mistaken to find this thing possible or as they say (figuratively) conceivable, i.e. to be possibly thought. He admits that it is necessary to understand the constituent parts of the notion “possible”. If we name “possible” the thing that can be, then evidently it will not be already a distribution of the notion about possibility, as it is entirely included in the expression “can be”. But it would be more incorrect to try to state the following definition: something thinkable is possible. Bolzano says we can think, including also imaginations, the impossible too. We do it actually any time, when we make a judgement on it and admit it, for example, being impossible [13].

01 Мар 2016 в 09:05. В рубриках: Арт-заметки. Автор: admin_lgaki

Вы можете оставить свой отзыв или трекбек со своего сайта.

Ваш отзыв