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The author concludes, that together with an object the content is also “imagined”. Considering the names as the language signs of imaginations Twardowski defines the three main functions of the name: 1. This is a report about imagination act, taking place inside the speaker; 2. Generation of the interlocutor’s psychic content, meaning of the object; 3. Naming of the object, imagined in the imagination, which is the meaning of the name [16].

Concerning these three functions Twardowski considers the expression “an acute-angled square”. He explains that the speaker of the expression “an acute-angled square” informs by this about his doing some imagination. The content, subjected to this act of imagination, will form the meaning of the title. But this title does not only mean something, it also names something, namely: something combining in it mutually contradictive properties, whose existence is denied at once, if you do not make a judgement on the named. However, no doubt something is named by means of the name, even if it does not exist. Twardowski stresses that this named greatly differs from the content of the imagination, because firstly, this content exists, and that one (i.e. something named) doesn’t, secondly, we attribute to the named some properties which are evidently do not belong to the content of the imagination. And consequently, if it possessed the mutually contradictive properties, it would not exist, but it does exist. Not the content of the imagination is the thing we attribute simultaneously acuteness and squareness, but the thing named by means of its name “an acute-angled square”, though it does not exist, but it is a represented carrier of these properties. The conclusion made by Twardowski illustrates the ratio of the imagination object and its name: an acute-angled square can be rejected only as an object of imagination. The rejected is the thing named by means of the name – “an acute-angled square”, as the content the imagination “an acute-angled square” cannot be rejected [17]. The analysis proposed by Twardowski can quite be related to such work as “The Green Hollow” or “Dark Freshness” by Kandinsky.

In the chapter “Die sogenannten “gegenstandslosen” Vorstellungen”, K. Twardowski gives three kinds of imaginations, and no object corresponds to them. Firstly, these are objects containing negation of every object, for example, the imagination nothing (Nichts). Secondly, these are imaginations, which have in principle no correspondent objects, for example, a round quadrilateral. The third kind includes the objects without any correspondent objects since at present according to the experience such an object cannot be pointed out [18].

01 Мар 2016 в 09:05. В рубриках: Арт-заметки. Автор: admin_lgaki

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